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ARTICLES
REFORMING THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871:
THE PROBLEM OF POLICE PERJURY
Michael Goldsmith*
Question: Now you just said there was a supervisor or a lieutenant
who joked about [police falsifications] in your presence?
[Officer]: That's correct, sir. Scenarios were, were you going to say
(a) that you observed what appeared to be a drug transaction; (b)
you observed a bulge in defendant's waistband; or (c) you were in-
formed by a male black, unidentified at this time that at that loca-
tion there were drug sales.
Question: So, in other words, what the lieutenant was telling you is:
here's your choice of false predicates for these arrests?
[Officer]: That's correct. Pick which one you're going to use.'
Testimony Before the City of New York
Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption
Procedures of the Police Department, 1994
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (Visiting Professor, Cornell Law
School, Winter 2005). B.S. 1972, J.D. 1975, Cornell University. The author is a
former counsel to the New York State Organized Crime Task Force and former Vice-
chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. This Article arose as a result of the
author's representation of Nelson Galbraith, who filed a § 1983 claim after having
been prosecuted for murder based on a falsified autopsy report. See Galbraith v.
County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Professor Goldsmith also serves
on the Board of Directors of the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Kimberlee Hiatt, BYU 2004, for her fine research
assistance, Scott Borrowman, BYU 2005, for his assistance reviewing this manuscript,
and to the BYU reference staff, especially Galen Fletcher and Ron Fuller.
1 COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YoRK, ANATOMY OF FAiL-
URE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 40-41 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT]
(quoting an officer's testimony before the Commission).
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INTRODUCTION
Police perjury is no joking matter, nor is it confined to New York
City. In 1999-2000, Texas authorities convicted thirty-eight mostly Af-
rican American defendants on fabricated narcotics charges.2 The
Texas experience bore a close resemblance to wrongful prosecutions
that occurred in Vermont approximately thirty years ago, where a sin-
gle high-profile officer's perjured testimony produced at least seventy-
one false narcotics convictions. 3
Fortunately, the Vermont victims found some measure of relief by
suing for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the present day codifica-
tion of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the CRA). 4 This
provision, which Congress enacted after the Civil War to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment,5 imposes civil liability upon "[e]very person
who, under color of [law] . . .subjects . . .any citizen .. . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 6 However, victims today can no longer rely
upon the CRA to provide adequate relief. An intervening 1983 Su-
preme Court decision, Briscoe v. LaHue, held that all witnesses who
2 Simon Romero & Adam Liptak, Texas Court Acts to Clear 38 in Town-Splitting
Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at Al (reporting the dismissal of all cases, includ-
ing those in which defendants had pleaded guilty). Initially, law enforcement author-
ities conducted a mass arrest of forty-six defendants, which comprised "more than
[ten] percent of Tulia's tiny African-American population." Bob Herbert, Editorial,
Kajka in Tulia, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at A19. When a few defendants convicted at
trial received prison terms ranging from sixty to 300 years, others rushed to plead
guilty in the hope of receiving leniency. Id.; see also ScoTr CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT:
INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASES 2 (2004) (analyzing wrongful convictions in New
York, but noting a nationwide problem).
3 HAMILTON E. DAVIS, MOCKINGJUSTICE 225-26 (1978); see alsoJoyce Jensen, Full
Unconditional Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1977, § 4, at 22 (reporting that the Vermont
Governor pardoned seventy-one persons wrongfully convicted of drug charges).
4 The pleadings are on file with the author.
5 In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person . .. the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Congress enacted section 1 of the CRA, now codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1983, as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 in response to concerns that
state officials of the former Confederacy both permitted and promoted actions to
deprive newly freed slaves of their legal rights. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325,
336-39 (1983); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961); see also ERWIN CHEMERIN-
SKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2 (4th ed. 2003) (reviewing the history and purpose of
§ 1983).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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commit perjury at trial, including police officers, enjoy absolute im-
munity from civil liability under the CRA.
7
The Supreme Court premised Briscoe on the conclusion that the
CRA had not abrogated pre-existing common law immunity for wit-
nesses8 and noted that only legislative reform can repair the resulting
statutory gap.9 Remarkably, although the decision engendered con-
siderable criticism, I0 none of its critics have proposed reforms that
respond to the Court's suggested legislative solution. Rather than en-
dure passage of another twenty years without congressional response,
this Article reconsiders the Briscoe decision, addresses its impact in
light of recent experience, and proposes legislative reform to elimi-
nate absolute immunity for perjured police testimony.
Part I of this Article explains that the Briscoe decision inevitably
flowed from a series of prior Supreme Court rulings extending com-
mon law immunities to defendants sued under the CRA and notes
that these decisions, including Briscoe, all violate the basic principle of
7 460 U.S. at 345-46. The Court stated:
In short, the rationale of our prior absolute immunity cases governs the dis-
position of this case. In 1871, common-law immunity for witnesses was well
settled. The principles set forth in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), to
protect judges, and in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), to protect
prosecutors, also apply to witnesses, who perform a somewhat different func-
tion in the trial process but whose participation in bringing the litigation to
a just-or possibly unjust-conclusion is equally indispensable.
Id.
8 Id. at 336-41. The Court also reasoned that to the extent the Civil Rights Act
may have been motivated by concerns about perjured testimony, Congress was con-
cerned about unjust acquittals rather than wrongful convictions.
This evidence does not, however, tend to show that Congress intended to
abrogate witness immunity in civil actions under § 1, which applied to
wrongs committed "under color of ... law." The bill's proponents were
exclusively concerned with perjury resulting in unjust acquittals-perjury
likely to be committed by private parties acting in furtherance of a conspir-
acy-and not with perjury committed "under color of law" that might lead to
unjust convictions. In hundreds of pages of debate there is no reference
to . . . perjury by a government official leading to an unjust conviction.
Id. at 339-40.
9 Id. at 344 n.30 ("[I1t is not for us to craft a new rule designed to enable trial
judges ... to allow recovery in cases of demonstrated injustice .... Congress has the
power to fashion an appropriate remedy if it perceives the need for one.").
10 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY LJ. 1311, 1313 n.12
(1994); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1055 n.78 (1996); TerenceJ. Corrigan, Case Note, Section 1983:
Absolute Immunity for Police Pejury, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), 9 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 687, 697-701 (1984); Eugene Scalia, Comment, Police Witness Immunity Under
§ 1983, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1433, 1433-38 (1989).
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statutory construction that Courts must ordinarily interpret a statute
according to its plain meaning. Part II discusses the nature and ex-
tent of perjured testimony in criminal prosecutions, explains why the
threat of criminal prosecution fails to deter perjury, and notes that
congressional reform restricting habeas corpus relief has exacerbated
the problem. Part III both examines the limited range of financial
remedies presently available for the wrongfully convicted and suggests
that, at least when police perjury constitutes a "custom" or "practice,"
Briscoe should not bar § 1983 liability for governmental entities that
promote or tolerate such conduct. Finally, Part IV critiques various
suggested reforms and proposes amending the CRA to eliminate abso-
lute immunity for law enforcement officials who commit perjury.
I. THE BASIS FOR BPJSCOE: COMMON LAW IMMUNITIES UNDER THE
CRA-WHEN "EvERY PERSON" DOES NOT MEAN "EvERY PERSON"
Section 1983 ostensibly applies to "every person" who violates its
provisions "under color of [law]."'I As such, the Briscoe holding ini-
tially appears contrary to both the purpose of the CRA12 and to the
principle of statutory construction requiring courts to interpret legis-
lation according to its plain meaning.' 3 Nevertheless, the Briscoe deci-
sion was hardly surprising. Although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a circuit split,1 4 its CRA decisions since 1951 fore-
shadowed the outcome in Briscoe. The Court had never read the CRA
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By its terms, § 1983 only applies to actions taken "under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia." Id. It does not generally apply to actions pursuant to
federal law, and it "provides no right of action against federal (rather than state)
officials." Russell v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999). In
the absence of a statutory remedy against federal officers, the Supreme Court has
recognized an implied right of action in various constitutional (but not statutory) pro-
visions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 (2001)
(noting that the Bivens remedy is at least available for certain violations of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendments).
12 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as
guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional
action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, orjudi-
cial."' (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879))); supra note 5; infra note
27.
13 See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:01
(6th ed. 2000).
14 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 328.
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literally, reasoning instead that § 1983 "cannot be understood in a his-
torical vacuum.
15
For example, starting with Tenney v. Brandhove,16 an action alleg-
ing that California legislators violated the plaintiffs First Amendment
rights through intimidation, the Supreme Court reasoned that Con-
gress could not have intended the general language of § 1983 "to
overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England...
and carefully preserved in [America]." 17 Accordingly, Tenney held
that Congress did not intend § 1983 to abrogate absolute legislative
immunity under pre-existing common law.' 8 Prior to Briscoe, the Su-
preme Court employed this reasoning to find that the Forty-Second
Congress, which enacted § 1983, intended to continue common law
immunities for several categories of defendants, including judges, gov-
ernors and other executive officials, and legislators, among others. 19
Thus, when faced with the question of absolute immunity for wit-
nesses under § 1983, the Briscoe Court readily credited Congress with
awareness of common law witness immunity and concluded that
§ 1983 incorporated that principle. 20 Justice Stevens's majority opin-
ion recognized that this outcome bars relief for wrongfully convicted
defendants, but concluded that "the alternative of limiting the offi-
cial's immunity would disserve the broader public interest."'2 ' From a
policy standpoint, Justice Stevens expressed concern that without ab-
solute immunity "witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to tes-
tify. And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be
distorted by the fear of subsequent liability."'22 Finally, although the
Court acknowledged that these concerns apply with "diminished
15 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981).
16 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
17 Id. at 376.
18 Id. at 378-79.
19 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (discussing immunity for
school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (governor and
other executive branch officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) (judges
and police officers); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (state legislators).
20 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983); cf. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at
258 (noting that an "important assumption underlying the Court's decisions in this
area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles,
including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they
likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to
the contrary").
21 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345.
22 Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
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force" to police officers as compared to private witnesses, 23 it declined
to "carve out an exception to the general rule of immunity in cases of
alleged perjury by police officer witnesses." 24
Cumulatively, the Court's willingness to continue common law
immunities for a wide range of governmental officials threatened to
undermine the very purpose of § 1983, which, by definition, only ap-
plies to persons acting "under color of [law]" who deprive others of
their constitutional rights. 25 Given this objective, the Briscoe majority's
interpretation of legislative history has been criticized as unduly nar-
row and improperly selective. 26 More fundamentally, however, Briscoe
and the other CRA immunity decisions contravene perhaps the first
principle of statutory construction: that Courts must give a statute its
plain meaning, unless doing so would produce absurd results. 27 A co-
rollary to this principle further dictates that judges ordinarily may not
23 Id. at 342. In contrast to private citizens, police officers have a duty to testify
and their professional interest in securing convictions "would assertedly counterbal-
ance any tendency to shade testimony in favor of potentially vindictive defendants."
Id. Moreover, they ordinarily enjoy only qualified immunity from § 1983 liability and
their government employers handle their defense. Id. Further, because juries usually
consider police witnesses to be credible, perjured police testimony is likely to be given
more weight than other witnesses. Id. Finally, the close relationship between prose-
cutors and the police results in the risk of criminal prosecution being "not an effec-
tive substitute for civil damages." Id.
24 Id. at 341-42.
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); see supra notes 5, 12. Thus, it makes no sense to im-
munize the same individuals that the statute targets. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("[T]o extend absolute immunity to any
group of state officials is to negate ... the very remedy ... Congress sought to cre-
ate."); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974) (noting that, through the CRA,
"Congress intended 'to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against
those who carry a badge of authority of a State .... whether they act in accordance
with their authority or misuse it"' (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72
(1961))).
26 See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 346-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf Donald H. Zeigler,
A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction,
1983 DuKE L.J. 987, 1011 (noting that legislators from the Forty-Second Congress
expressed concerns about witnesses regularly committing perjury).
27 See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its
language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.'" (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980))); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (noting that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan-
guage of the statute itself").
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consider a statute's legislative history to interpret its plain meaning. 28
Indeed, the strict constructionist Supreme Court routinely applies this
principle, emphasizing that legislative history properly becomes an in-
terpretative tool only when statutory language is ambiguous. 29 In con-
trast, the text of § 1983, which applies to "every person,"30 is certainly
broad but hardly ambiguous.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has declined to give the CRA its
plain meaning; therefore, "every person" who violates this statute is
not necessarily liable under § 1983. Police officers and other govern-
ment officials may perjure themselves without risk of statutory civil
liability. Unfortunately, such perjury often contributes to wrongful
convictions.
II. PERJURY, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, AND HABEAS
CORPUS RESTRICTIONS
Although our criminal justice system is premised on the principle
"that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer,"3' 1 recent experience demonstrates that wrongful convictions
are not uncommon. Based upon a current prison population of
2,000,000, recent studies report that an error rate of just 0.5% would
translate into 10,000 wrongful convictions.
32
28 See 2A SINGER, supra note 13, § 46:04 ("It has been held that the remarks of a
legislator, even the sponsor of the bill, will not override the plain meaning of a
statute.").
29 See BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1587, 1593 (2004) (declining to
look to legislative history in interpreting an unambiguous statute); United States v.
Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (refusing to consider legislative history when the stat-
ute was straightforward).
30 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
31 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Indeed, Benjamin Franklin
would have placed the ratio at 100:1. Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 173, 175 n.13 (1997) (quoting Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin
Vaughan (Mar. 14, 1785), in 11 THE WoRxs OF BENJAMIN FRA K.IN 11, 13 (John Bige-
low ed., fed. ed. 1904)).
32 C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 61-62 (1996) (reporting statistical analysis); see also Daniel
Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Inno-
cent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1997) (describing studies reporting an errone-
ous conviction rate ranging from 0.5% to five percent). This is not a new problem.
See generally EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXv-FvE ACTUAL ER-
RORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at vii (1932) (detailing a landmark study on twentieth cen-
tury wrongful conviction cases and noting that the sixty-five cases in the study "have
been selected from a much larger number" and that "they come from all sections of
the country"). In capital cases, the erroneous conviction rate has often been higher.
See, e.g., Barry C. Scheck & Sarah L. Tofte, Gideon's Promise and the Innocent Defendant,
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No definitive data exists documenting the degree to which police
perjury accounts for wrongful convictions. However, there is over-
whelming anecdotal evidence of widespread police perjury in our
criminal justice system. 33 Most often, it occurs at pretrial suppression
hearings litigating defense claims of police constitutional violations. 34
Since judges finding constitutional error must often suppress incrimi-
nating evidence, 35 police witnesses anxious to avoid this result can
readily rationalize perjury in the interest of convicting a guilty defen-
dant.3 6 Indeed, this practice has become so common that police of-
ficers themselves refer to it as "testilying. ''37
Although motions to exclude evidence are designed to vindicate
constitutional rights and rarely touch upon claims of actual inno-
cence, policy perjury at suppression hearings can increase the risk of
THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 38, 38 (reporting that, in 2000, Illinois Governor
George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions after finding that seventeen of
twenty-nine men on death row were innocent); see also Keith A. Findley, Learning from
Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 333, 336 (2002) (reporting more than 100 exonerations from death row);
Sharon Cohen & Deborah Hastings, Associated Press, For 110 Inmates Freed by DNA
Tests, True Freedom Remains Elusive, May 28, 2002, available at http://www.truthinjus-
tice.org/truefreedom.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005); Richard C. Dieter, Death Pen-
alty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty: The Increasing Danger of Executing the
Innocent (1997), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=292#
thirty-two (reporting that of 6000 persons sentenced to death between 1973 and 1996,
courts released sixty-nine based on evidence of innocence).
33 For example, Professor Alan Dershowitz has observed:
Every objective study of police perjury has come to similar conclusions. The
problem of pervasive police perjury is rampant in every major city in the
country. Joseph McNamara, the former police chief of San Jose and Kansas
City ... recently said that he had "come to believe that hundreds of
thousands of law enforcement officers commit felony perjury every year testi-
fying about drug arrests."
Alan Dershowitz, Editorial, Police Testilying Must Not Be Tolerated, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
11, 1997, at A27; see also Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1041-42 (providing numerous
examples); Scott Cooper, Chemist's Colleagues Saw Warning Signs, DAILY OKLAHOMAN
(Oklahoma City), May 13, 2001, at 1-A (reporting that a state laboratory chemist had
provided dubious testimony in hundreds of cases); David Kocieniewski, New York Pays
a High Price for Police Lies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, § 1, at 1 (reporting the dismissal of
125 cases: "more dismissals than in any other police perjury case on record in the
state"); infra notes 40, 90.
34 See Cloud, supra note 10, at 1312; Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1042-44.
35 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
36 Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1044 ("The most obvious explanation for all this
lying is a desire to see the guilty brought to 'justice.'").
37 MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 36.
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wrongful conviction. 38 Moreover, when such perjury occurs at trial, it
is even more likely to convict the innocent. 39 The Innocence Project
reports that police misconduct, including perjured testimony, contrib-
uted to approximately fifty percent of wrongful convictions, 40 and
press accounts certainly confirm that the problem is not isolated.
41
Yet those responsible rarely, if ever, face prosecution. 42 This is hardly
surprising, as the prospect of prosecuting law enforcement personnel
poses an intractable conflict of interest for district attorneys and their
38 For example, when officers falsely rely upon the "plain view" doctrine to ex-
plain their failure to obtain a search warrant, they potentially expose innocent people
to wrongful conviction. This can easily occur because crimes such as illegal possession
of narcotics require prosecutors to establish that the defendant acted knowingly. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2000) (requiring knowing possession of a controlled substance).
Thus, if the police find narcotics hidden in a bureau drawer, a house guest unaware
of its contents would have a viable defense based on lack of criminal intent. However,
if the officers lacked a warrant (or if their warrant did not authorize them to open
bureau drawers) and they rely upon the plain view doctrine to justify the seizure, their
trial testimony that they found the evidence in an open area will necessarily conflict
with a defendant's legitimate claim of lack of knowledge. See MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 38 (noting practices of claiming to have found evidence in
plain view and falsifying the location of the defendant's arrest).
39 See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, Boston Police "Testilying" Leaves Trail of Injustice, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1997, at Al (discussing police fabrications during trial testimony).
In West Virginia, two state laboratory chemists fabricated results in numerous cases.
See Martha Bryson Hodel, W Virginia to Begin Trial for Chemist, DAILY OKLAHOMAN
(Oklahoma City), Sept. 4, 2001, at 8-C. Their work led the West Virginia Supreme
Court to state that "as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence of-
fered by Zain [the state trooper] at any time in any criminal prosecution should be
deemed invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible." State ex rel. McClure v. Trent, 504
S.E.2d 165, 171 n.10 (W. Va. 1998) (per curiam).
40 BARRY SCHECK ET AL., AcTuAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246, 265 (2000).
41 See supra note 33.
42 Between 1999 and 2004, perjury convictions accounted for only seventy-five to
eighty-three of approximately 60,000 offenders sentenced in federal court. Federal
sentencing statistics do not specify how many of these involved police officers. How-
ever, the data show that fewer than three percent of these involved enhancements for
abuse of trust, which is the specific offense characteristic that would apply both to
police officers and others in special positions of authority. E-mail from Louis Reedt,
Acting Director, Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission, to Michael
Goldsmith, Professor of Law, Brigham Young University (Apr. 13, 2004, 11:17:43
EDT) (on file with author); see Lisa C. Harris, Note, Pejury Defeats Justice, 42 WAYNE L.
REv. 1755, 1768-71 (1996); cf Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, A.B.A.J., May 1995, at
68, 69 (noting that, with few exceptions, "perjury is probably the most underp-
rosecuted crime in America"). This trend dates back more than thirty-five years. See
David W. Eagle, Note, Civil Remedies for Pejury: A Proposal for a Tort Action, 19 ARIz. L.
REv. 349, 351 (1977) (noting that in 1968, only two of 20,000 federal prisoners were
convicted of perjury).
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federal counterparts. To function effectively, prosecutors depend on
the police to investigate crime. The police, in turn, rely upon prose-
cutors to obtain convictions through the judicial system. These mutu-
ally dependent and supporting roles inevitably require prosecutors
and police to work closely together on a regular basis. A prosecutor
who files perjury charges against a police officer risks jeopardizing this
vital relationship with his law enforcement team.43 Further, although
many officers disdain perjury and those who commit it, 4 4 the police
culture historically has maintained a "blue wall of silence '45 against
outside investigations. Thus, few police perjury prosecutions occur
nationwide. 4
6
But absent an effective criminal sanction, there is little to deter
police perjury. On the contrary, recent legislative reforms, which
both restrict and discourage habeas corpus petitions, have heightened
the problem. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996,47 which, despite its title, applies in both capital and noncapital
cases, imposed a one-year limitations period on filing for a writ of
habeas corpus,48 heightened the standard for filing successive peti-
43 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice,
and the American Way: The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339,
358 n.75 (1994) (noting that the need for "smooth working relations" explains the
"institutional tendency to tolerate police perjury"). Dissenting in Briscoe, Justice Mar-
shall observed: "[T]he threat of a criminal perjury prosecution ... is virtually non-
existent in the police-witness context ... [because] prosecutors exhibit extreme reluc-
tance in charging police officials with criminal conduct because of their need to main-
tain close working relationships with law enforcement agencies." Briscoe, 460 U.S. at
365-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Commenting on this relationship, Professor Irving
Younger, a former judge and prosecutor, wrote that "a policeman is as likely to be
indicted for perjury by his co-worker, the prosecutor, as he is to be struck down by
thunderbolts from an avenging heaven." Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NA-
TION, May 8, 1967, at 596, 596; see also Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1047-48 (noting the
conflict of interest stemming from the prosecutor-police relationship).
44 See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 137-49 (providing an example of a corrupt officer's
partner reporting concerns to prosecutors).
45 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Koepke, Note, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence:
The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 213 n.10 (2000)
(citing numerous decisions noting the existence of an unwritten code).
46 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-2255, 2261-2266 (2000)); seeJames S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"?
AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 416-18 (2001) (pro-
viding an excellent summary of new provisions); Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Inno-
cence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas
Corpus Petitions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2101, 2103, 2111-14 (2002) (reviewing AEDPA restric-
tions and noting the adverse impact on claims of actual innocence).
48 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2000).
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tions contesting a state conviction, 49 made it more difficult to present
new evidence in support of a federal habeas claim, 50 narrowed the
authority of federal courts to overturn erroneous state court rulings,
51
and curtailed the right to appeal an adverse ruling denying post-con-
viction relief.52 In light of these measures, police officers contemplat-
ing perjury know that defendants are not likely even to obtain a post-
conviction evidentiary hearing, much less prevail, in federal court.
Taken together, these developments leave the wrongfully convicted
few options for habeas relief. Even if successful, however, an exoner-
ated convict will not likely receive financial indemnification.
III. RECOVERY OPTIONS FOR THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED
The wrongfully convicted enjoy no right to full compensation for
their loss. Instead, in varying degrees, they are left to whatever mone-
tary or other forms of relief Congress and state legislatures have
chosen to authorize.5 3 Most jurisdictions, however, provide no com-
pensation whatsoever, and those that do sometimes fail to afford relief
commensurate with the loss incurred. For example, of the fourteen
states that authorize compensation for wrongful convictions, 54 three
49 Id. § 2244(a)-(b).
50 Id. § 2254(e) (2).
51 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-08 (2000) (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (1)).
52 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
53 See Adele Bernhard, WhenJustice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 73 n.1, 101 (1999) (noting and citing fifteen state stat-
utes providing some compensation for the wrongfully convicted). Since 1999, at least
one jurisdiction has repealed its indemnification law. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 78(a),
§ 16A (2003). Thirty-six states provide no relief for wrongful conviction. See CHRIS-
TIANSON, supra note 2, at 167-86.
54 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2000) (enacted 1941); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (West 1999) (enacted 1945); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1
(West 1998) (enacted 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241 (West 2003) (enacted
1993); MD ANN. CODE art. 78(a), § 16(A) (2003) (enacted 1963); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-B:14 (1997) (enacted 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West 2001);
N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 1989) (enacted 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82
(2003) (enacted 1947); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.02, 2743.48 (Anderson 2001)
(enacted 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (1999) (enacted 1955); TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001 (Vernon 1997) (enacted 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-13a (Michie 2004) (enacted 1987); Wis. STAT. § 775.05 (2001) (enacted 1943).
There is also a federal compensation statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2000) (en-
acted 1948). The District of Columbia has such a law as well. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
421-25 (2001) (enacted 1981).
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limit recovery to between $20,000 and $50,000 regardless of duration
of imprisonment;55 federal law caps restitution at $5,000.56
The absence of legislative largesse undoubtedly reflects the view
that the government is not always responsible for erroneous judg-
ments. Simple trial error, mistaken identification, and good faith mis-
takes account for as many wrongful convictions as police and
prosecutorial misconduct. 57 Although certainly harsh to individual
victims, this situation reflects both the economic constraints of gov-
ernmental entities and the grim reality that life is unfair. Indeed, leg-
islative remedies generally draw no distinction based on the nature
and cause of the wrongful conviction. 58 Victims of police perjury thus
receive no more compensation than those wrongfully convicted due
to inadvertent jury confusion or a wholly innocent mistaken
identification.
The state's moral obligation to pay those wrongfully convicted
without fault, however, differs sharply from the legal obligation which
the state and its police officers should face for intentional civil rights
violations. When governmental misconduct, such as police perjury,
causes wrongful convictions, public policy calls for compensating the
victims adequately both to remediate their loss to the extent possible
and to deter future false testimony.59 Existing state laws, however, fall
55 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 ($20,000); TEX. Cv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 103.006 ($50,000); Wis. STAT. § 775.05 ($25,000). Those jurisdictions which base
relief on longevity of wrongful confinement do not necessarily provide compensation
commensurate with the harm, though. For example, Illinois provides a graduated
compensation plan but caps recovery at $35,000 once the wrongful confinement ex-
ceeds fourteen years. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c).
56 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513.
57 See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 40, at 246 (listing a variety of other factors);
Scheck & Tofte, supra note 32, at 38-39; Innocence Project, Causes and Remedies of
Wrongful Convictions, at http://www.innocenceproject.com/causes (last visited Feb.
21, 2005) (noting that contributing causes include false confessions (15%), unreliable
informants (16%), false testimony (17%), inaccurate microscopic hair comparisons
(21%), incompetent counsel (21%), defective science (26%), prosecutorial miscon-
duct (34%), police misconduct (38%), serology inclusion (40%), and mistaken iden-
tification (61%)); see also Tom Spring, 10,000 Innocent People Convicted Each Year, Study
Estimates, at http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/ronhuff.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2005) (noting perjury contributed to eleven percent of wrongful convictions, and eye-
witness misidentifications were a factor in 52.3%).
58 See Bernhard, supra note 53, at 73 n.1 (listing applicable statutes).
59 The testimony of police officers is often decisive in the criminal justice system.
As the Mollen Commission observed: "On the word of a police officer alone a grand
jury may indict, a trial jury convict, and a judge pass sentence." MOLLEN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 36; cf Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Requiring culpable officers to pay damages to the victims of their actions ... holds
out promise of both deterring and remediating violations of the Constitution.").
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far short of this goal.6
Lacking adequate legislative recourse, victims have turned to the
courts. However, because police witnesses who commit perjury at trial
enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under the CRA, victims
must consider other theories of liability. Potential claims could be
based on (a) pretrial perjury, (b) the tort of malicious prosecution,
(c) the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and (d) governmental
liability. None provide adequate relief.
A. Pretrial Perjury
Briscoe expressly left open the question whether absolute immu-
nity also applies to perjury committed pretrial.
61 Accordingly, victims
may consider a § 1983 claim alleging pretrial perjury. Indeed, this
theory finds support from the Supreme Court's subsequent decision
in Malley v. Briggs,62 which sustained a claim against a police officer
who allegedly submitted an arrest warrant affidavit lacking probable
cause. The Court ruled in Malley that, because "complaining wit-
nesses" at common law held qualified, rather than absolute, immu-
nity, complaining police officers enjoy no greater immunity under the
CRA.
6 3
60 Nor have recent high-profile exonerations prompted remedial legislative ac-
tion. For example, in 2001, Oklahoma authorities released Jeff Pierce after he served
almost fifteen years for a crime he did not commit. The state legislature rejected
proposed legislation that would have compensated him in some respect. See Tim Tal-
ley, House Defeats Bill for Prison Lawsuits, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 22,
2001, at 4-A. Instead of paying damages, the legislature issued a formal apology. Id.
61 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.5 (1983).
62 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
63 Id. at 340. The Court reasoned as follows:
Although the statute on its face admits of no immunities, we have read it "in
harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather
than in derogation of them." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
Our initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under § 1983
can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts. Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984)....
[C]omplaining witnesses were not absolutely immune at common
law. In 1871, the generally accepted rule was that one who procured the
issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable
if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause. Given
malice and the lack of probable cause, the complainant enjoyed no
immunity.
Id. at 339-41; see also Scalia, supra note 10, at 1456 (arguing that Malley "furnishes the
means by which lower courts can adjust for the error made by the Supreme Court in
Briscod').
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Accordingly, the wrongfully accused may assert a § 1983 claim
based upon a complaining officer's perjury in an affidavit supporting
a warrant application. However, this theory provides only uncertain
and incomplete relief. As the police may also commit perjury in other
pretrial settings, recovery is uncertain because courts are divided over
whether absolute immunity extends to grand jury proceedings and
pretrial hearings. 64 And in cases of wrongful convictions, any relief
would be incomplete because Briscoe's absolute immunity doctrine for
witnesses precludes proof that the defendant police officer committed
perjury at the trial which produced the plaintiffs false conviction. 65
Thus, the plaintiffs proof at trial and monetary recovery would not
encompass the corrupt officer's most damaging actions. Similar issues
arise in connection with an action based on the tort of malicious
prosecution.
B. Malicious Prosecution
The tort of malicious prosecution offers an important, albeit im-
perfect, vehicle to overcome the absolute immunity doctrine. Mali-
cious prosecution requires proof that the defendant (e.g., the
complaining police officer), acting with malice and without probable
cause, effected a wrongful prosecution in which the plaintiff ulti-
mately was exonerated. 66 This action differs from one based exclu-
sively on pretrial perjury in that malicious prosecution can be based
on both sworn and unsworn false statements. 67
However, although the malicious prosecution theory offers some
potential relief, its application is quite limited. The action is ideally
suited for the rare defendant, wrongfully accused, who wins pretrial
dismissal on the merits. 68 Under such circumstances, the victim's re-
covery would include damages for mental distress, economic costs
64 Indeed, most courts extend Briscoe absolute immunity to grand jury proceed-
ings and pretrial hearings. See IA MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9.10, at 298-99 (3d ed. 1997) (citing
authority).
65 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining "relevant" evidence). Although such proof
would still be admissible against a municipality to establish a pattern of wrongdoing as
required for a Monell claim, the testifying officer's absolute immunity renders such
proof a nullity as to him. See infra notes 83-94.
66 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §119, at
871 (5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Penn v. Harris, 296 F.3d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A
criminal case terminates in an accused's favor when the circumstances surrounding
dismissal reflect innocence.").
67 KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, § 119, at 872.
68 This could occur, for example, if the magistrate dismisses the case for lack of
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stemming from wrongful detention, and expenses for having to de-
fend a wrongful prosecution.
69
In other situations, however, a malicious prosecution action
could be problematic. For example, an arrest warrant might be based
upon an officer's affidavit containing false allegations. Regardless of
the defendant's ultimate exoneration, a subsequent malicious prose-
cution action would fail if the court finds the affidavit's remaining
allegations sufficient to establish probable cause.
70 Ordinarily, mali-
cious prosecution would also fail when a successful suppression mo-
tion (based on unconstitutional conduct) prompts the government to
dismiss charges. Because suppression motions are based on constitu-
tional violations rather than claims of innocence, resulting dismissals
almost never directly exonerate the accused.
71 The defendant may
very well be innocent, but the record underlying the court's suppres-
sion ruling almost never addresses this issue.
72 Absent actual exonera-
tion, however, the malicious prosecution action fails.
Finally, even when post-conviction proceedings exonerate a
wrongfully convicted defendant, Briscoe's absolute immunity doctrine
still precludes complete relief as the plaintiff's trial-related damages
would not encompass injury stemming from the officer's trial per-
produce a judgment, as the defendant could still have been guilty or the charges
otherwise supported by probable cause. See id. § 119, at 880, 885.
69 Id. § 119, at 887-89.
70 See, e.g., Moore v. Hayes, No. 97-1188, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS. 16383, at *9 (6th
Cir. July 14, 1998) (noting that a malicious prosecution claim "must specifically allege
either the absence of probable cause or specific instances of prosecutorial misconduct
which, if proven, would negate probable cause"); cf Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171-72 (1978) (noting that when material in an affidavit accompanying a search war-
rant is shown to be false, if there remains enough content to show probable cause, an
evidentiary hearing is not required).
71 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 66, § 119, at 874 (noting that "termination must
also reflect the merits and not merely a procedural victory"); 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.7(b), at 434 (4th
ed. 2004) ("[A]n at-trial granting of a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment
grounds, followed by a dismissal of the case, is a 'termination of the proceedings ...
on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence'...." (quoting People v. Greer, 282
N.W.2d 819, 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979))).
72 Suppression motions involve allegations of police misconduct during the evi-
dence gathering process. The defendant's guilt or innocence is usually irrelevant to
the court's ruling. Indeed, this is one of the features that makes the exclusionary rule
so controversial. As the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he costs of applying the
exclusionary rule even at trial and on direct review are well known: the focus of the
trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal pro-
ceeding." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976).
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jury.73 Full relief requires the plaintiff to prove all the events that
produced his wrongful conviction-especially those that occurred at
trial. A claim based on the prosecution's failure to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence achieves this goal to a somewhat greater degree.
C. Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the defense.74 As this principle bears directly upon a defendant's pos-
sible innocence, a Brady violation can readily produce a wrongful con-
viction. Brady violations are certainly subject to § 1983 claims. 75
Relying on Brady also overcomes Briscoe's absolute immunity because,
rather than asserting a claim based on immunized perjured testimony,
the plaintiffs complaint charges that the defendant(s) withheld excul-
patory evidence pretrial. 76 As this omission places into question the
integrity of the entire ensuing prosecution, the plaintiffs proof could
certainly include relevant portions of the criminal trial proceedings,
as well as all damages stemming from wrongful conviction.
These advantages make a Brady-based § 1983 claim more attrac-
tive than the options outlined above, but this theory of liability still has
some flaws. Foremost among them, not all police perjury necessarily
constitutes a Brady violation. Thus, a plaintiff may not overcome the
Briscoe absolute immunity doctrine simply by recasting his action as a
Brady claim. 77 For example, it is not necessarily enough to allege that
73 See generally 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.4 (2d ed. 1993)
(describing damages in constitutional civil cases). Plaintiff, however, could recover
other economic and emotional damages associated with having to mount a trial
defense.
74 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
75 See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that withholding of exculpatory fingerprint evidence from the prosecutor by police
supported a valid claim under § 1983);Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 662-63 (4th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (arguing that intentional, "bad faith" withholding of evidence to
deprive a criminal defendant of use of that evidence at trial supports a § 1983 claim);
Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1558-59 (5th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing between
absolute immunity for trial testimony and potential liability for deliberate conceal-
ment of exculpatory evidence).
76 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text; see also McCullah v. Gadert, 344
F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between Brady and Briscoe claims); lenco
v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) ("Neither the withholding of
exculpatory information nor the initiation of constitutionally infirm criminal pro-
ceedings is protected by absolute immunity .... [N]o absolute immunity attaches to
the actions of the officers outside of trial ....").
77 See Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 2003). The court rejected a
Brady claim because the plaintiff knew what he said at his interrogation. Id. ("The
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the police officer perjured himself at trial and withheld his knowledge
of the defendant's innocence. To succeed, the civil rights plaintiff
must demonstrate some active concealment or withholding of excul-
patory evidence. 78 As such information is usually within control of
police authorities, this evidentiary burden poses serious obstacles for
civil rights plaintiffs.
Moreover, Brady only requires that prosecutors disclose exculpa-
tory evidence to the defense. This obligation does not run to the po-
lice, as they are not expected to have contact with defense counsel.
79
The police face liability under Brady only if they conceal or withhold
exculpatory evidence from the prosecuting agency.
80 Shockingly, if a
police officer makes full disclosure to prosecutors who, in turn, violate
Brady and conspire to have the officer commit perjury at trial, neither
the individual prosecutors nor the police officers would necessarily
face individual liability under the CRA. Under such circumstances,
Briscoe confers absolute immunity for the officer's perjured testimony
at trial, and prosecutors would escape liability because they enjoy ab-
solute civil immunity for trial functions, including the failure to satisfy
Brady.8' Moreover, most circuits have extended absolute immunity
under Briscoe to prosecutors alleged to have conspired with a witness
problem was not that evidence useful to him was being concealed; the problem was
that the detectives were giving false evidence.").
78 See id.; Manning v. Dye, No. 02-C372, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12649, at *3-4
(N.D. 11. July 18, 2003) (distinguishing between Briscoe and Brady and emphasizing
officers' active concealment of evidence); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
281-82 (1999) ("The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either be-
cause it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have
ensued.").
79 See, e.g., Mowbrayv. Cameron County, Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Brady imposes a duty on prosecutors to share exculpatory evidence with the de-
fense .... [O]ur research reveals no case extending Brady to police officers . . ").
80 See, e.g., id. at 278 n.5 (noting that the plaintiff failed to allege that the police
concealed exculpatory evidence from the prosecution); Jean, 221 F.3d at 660 (holding
that the Brady duty of disclosure to a criminal defendant rests with the prosecution).
81 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-29 (1976) (holding that prosecutors
enjoy absolute immunity for allegedly using perjured testimony and suppressing ex-
culpatory evidence); see also Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Will-
ful or malicious prosecutorial misconduct is egregious by definition, yet prosecutors
are absolutely immune from liability for such conduct if it occurs in the exercise of
their advocatory function."); Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1373
n.4 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Whether the claim involves withholding evidence, failing to
correct a misconception or instructing a witness to testify evasively, absolute immunity
from civil damages is the rule for prosecutors.").
12752005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
to commit perjury.82 Given these obstacles, a claim alleging govern-
mental liability may provide the most viable option under § 1983.
D. Governmental Liability
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,8 3 the Supreme Court over-
ruled an earlier decision that had found municipalities "wholly im-
mune from suit under section 1983."84 Monell declined to hold
municipalities vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior, reasoning that Congress did not intend the existence of an
employment relationship alone to be sufficient to warrant statutory
damages. 85 However, Justice Brennan's majority opinion concluded
that both the text and legislative history of § 1983 demonstrated Con-
gress's intent to impose municipal liability where "the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a [municipal]
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially
adopted. ' 86 In addition, because constitutional violations often occur
outside formal parameters, the Court recognized that § 1983 also im-
poses municipal liability "for constitutional deprivations visited pursu-
ant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body's official decision making
channels."
8 7
As a Monell claim addresses a municipality's pattern of civil rights
violations, it should prevail notwithstanding an individual officer's suc-
cessful assertion of Briscoe's absolute immunity defense. Monells focus
on municipal liability renders irrelevant both evidentiary proof of in-
dividual liability88 and Briscoe's concerns about the need to protect
individual witnesses from financial harassment or intimidation. In
82 See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) ("The majority
of circuits that have addressed the issue have extended the absolute immunity for a
witness's trial testimony under Briscoe to those persons who allegedly conspire with the
witness to present allegedly false testimony."); see also Robinson, 940 F.2d at 1373 n.4
("Whether the claim involves withholding evidence, failing to correct a misconcep-
tion or instructing a witness to testify evasively, absolute immunity from civil damages
is the rule for prosecutors.").
83 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
84 Id. at 662-63 (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
85 Id. at 693-94; see I SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION-THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION § 6:5 (4th ed. 2004).
86 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
87 Id. at 690-91.
88 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance in terms of elements of a cause of
action). Rather than establishing individual liability, plaintiff would introduce evi-
dence of the officer's perjury as part of an overall pattern of misconduct triggering
municipal liability.
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short, because a Monell claim does not hinge on establishing an indi-
vidual officer's liability, a witness's absolute immunity defense under
Briscoe should not defeat a Monell claim of municipal liability.
Monel, therefore, offers the wrongfully convicted a potentially vi-
able option. Indeed, it holds special promise in view of subsequent
decisions extending municipal liability to local governments that act
with "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights.
8 9 This line of
authority could dramatically impact civil rights claims involving police
perjury given widespread evidence that supervisors routinely tolerate
"testilying." 90
Despite its potential, however, Monell remains remarkably un-
derutilized in police perjury cases.91 The decision certainly is not
without serious obstacles and limitations. First, as Monell applies only
to local governmental bodies, it does not reach states or state law en-
forcement agencies. 92 Second, Monell only concerns alleged constitu-
tional deprivations that reflect a policy, practice, or 
custom; 93
municipal liability under the CRA ordinarily does not exist for isolated
violations resulting in wrongful conviction.
94 Therefore, a Monell
claim imposes more demanding elements of proof than do § 1983 ac-
tions based on individual liability. Finally, even when a plaintiff can
prove these elements, the Supreme Court has ruled that punitive dam-
89 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85,
§ 6:41; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-40 (1994) (elaborating upon the
deliberate indifference standard).
90 See, e.g., MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40 ("What is particularly
troublesome about this practice [of police falsifications] is that it is widely tolerated by
corrupt and honest officers alike, as well as their supervisors."); Alan Dershowitz, Po-
lice Head Confirms "Testilying, " TIMES UNION (Albany), Nov. 25, 1995, at A7 (quoting a
police commissioner who said that "cops are almost taught how to commit perjury
when they are in the police academy"); Dershowitz, supra note 33 (noting that prose-
cutors, in effect, train officers to "tailor their testimony to the requirements of the
law"); Anthony Flint, Bratton Calls 'Testilying' by Police a Real Concern, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 15, 1995, at Al (noting "young officers generally learn how to testify... through
on-the-job training" and reporting a police commissioner's call for improved
training).
91 For example, on April 15, 2004, a Lexis search produced only seventy-seven
cases (between 1978 and 2004) discussing possibly pertinent terms.
92 Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989).
93 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
94 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 6:40; see, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (reversing because a jury instruction permitted an isolated
incident to serve as the basis for § 1983 liability). Tuttle allowed for the possibility of a
single incident triggering Monell liability if "proof of the incident includes proof that
it was caused by an existing unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be
attributed to a municipal policy maker." Id. at 824. "Failure to train" cases may fall
within this realm of proof. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 6:39.
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ages may not be imposed against a municipality for policies and prac-
tices established by its officials. 95 Thus, despite evidence of systematic
and egregious official misconduct, a plaintiff may only recover com-
pensatory damages. Punitive damages are generally available in
§ 1983 actions alleging individual liability,96 but in wrongful convic-
tion cases, Briscoe renders this sanction wholly illusory, as the police
officer who committed perjury at trial-often the most blameworthy
individual-enjoys absolute immunity under the CRA.
Thus, current law affords no reliable monetary recourse for the
wrongfully convicted. Nor does it adequately deter police perjury.
Achieving these twin goals requires legislative reform.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The Supreme Court's decision in Briscoe, which held that police
officers who commit perjury enjoy absolute immunity for their trial
testimony, undermined a major objective of the CRA: holding state
officials accountable for violating constitutional rights. 97 In reaching
this decision, the Court strayed from conventional principles of statu-
tory construction and relied upon a questionable analysis of legislative
history to read the words "every person" out of the statute. 98 However,
even if the Court concluded accurately that the Forty-Second Con-
gress intended to incorporate common law immunities into the CRA,
this ruling need not control modern civil rights litigation indetermi-
nately. Congress remains free to revisit this issue in light of current
civil rights abuses and to repeal a common law immunity no longer
suited to modern needs.99 Remarkably, although the National Insti-
tute of Justice at the Department of Justice documented twenty-eight
95 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981).
96 See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 4:42 (identifying relevant factors for punitive
damages awards).
97 See supra notes 5, 12, 25 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
99 The Supreme Court "look[s] to the common law and other history for gui-
dance because ... [its] role is 'not to make a freewheeling policy choice,' but rather
to discern Congress' likely intent in enacting § 1983." Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
493 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). Even the Court,
however, has declined to allow "arcane rules of the common law" to control the "pre-
cise contours of official immunity." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)
(noting that the Court has "reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at
all embodied in the common law"). Congress enjoys even more latitude in this re-
gard, since the scope of any statutory immunity is more properly a legislative function.
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wrongful felony convictions in 1996,100 Congress has neither fully in-
vestigated this issue nor carefully considered to what extent police
perjury contributed to these miscarriages of justice.10' Extensive con-
gressional hearings would bear out the concerns this Article has iden-
tified and provide the foundation for carefully tailored legislative
reform eliminating absolute CRA immunity for police witnesses.
Such reform would provide needed relief for victims of police
perjury. It would also promote effective law enforcement. As police
perjury has become a more pervasive problem, the public's view of law
enforcement witnesses has become more skeptical and made juries
less inclined to return guilty verdicts. 10 2 Legislative reform would be-
gin the process necessary to restore public confidence in the criminal
justice system.
Such reform need not defeat any legitimate policy considerations
underlying the Briscoe decision. In addition to its analysis of legislative
history, the Supreme Court identified three interrelated concerns: (1)
that fear of subsequent litigation might make some witnesses "reluc-
tant to come forward to testify,"'10 3 (2) that those who do testify might
distort or soften their testimony to reduce the risk of future liability,
0 4
100 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CONVICTED BYJURIES, EXONER-
ATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE
AFTER TRIAL 12 (1996).
101 For example, since 1996 Congress has only conducted a few hearings concern-
ing wrongful convictions and enacted no ameliorative legislation. For the most part,
Congress has focused on DNA issues to the exclusion of others. Some witnesses, how-
ever, have addressed a broader range of problems. See Margery Malkin Koosed, The
Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Identifications, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 268-71 (2002); Barry C. Scheck, Preventing Execution of the Innocent:
Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1170-71
(2001).
102 For example, police perjury played a significant role in the OJ. Simpson trial.
See Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1037-40; James Sterngold, Detective in Simpson Case
Pleads No Contest to Perjury Count, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,1996, at A16. Its role in Simpson's
acquittal, of course, is unknown. However, at least one expert has observed that when
"police routinely and casually lie under oath .. .members of the public, including
those who serve on juries, [are] less willing to believe all police, truthful or not."
Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1039; see also Ed Godfrey, Poll Shows Oklahomans Distrust
System, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Oklahoma City), May 27, 2001, at 1-A (reporting results of
a poll taken after the discovery of wrongful conviction based on perjured testimony);
Joe Sexton, Jurors Question Honesty of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B3 (reporting
distrust of New York City police officers because of perjury scandals).
103 Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333 (1983).
104 Id. The Court observed that "[a] witness who knows that he might be forced to
defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade
his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to
deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence." Id.
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and (3) "that those involved in judicial proceedings should 'be given
every encouragement to make full disclosure of all pertinent informa-
tion within their knowledge.' "105
Although the Briscoe Court declined to distinguish between pri-
vate citizens and police witnesses,' 06 these concerns do not apply with
equal force to law enforcement personnel. In contrast to private citi-
zens, police officers are duty bound to testify about criminal activity-
for them, testifying is not a matter of choice. Nor would any officer
have incentive to soften his testimony in favor of the defense. If any-
thing, securing a defendant's conviction reduces the risk of future liti-
gation accusing the officer of peijury. This is especially true after the
Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Heck v. Humphrey'0 7 held that, to
avoid "'creat[ing] .. .two [potentially] conflicting resolutions arising
out of the same or identical transaction,"'1 08 a § 1983 claimant may
not recover without first establishing that his original conviction was
invalidated either on direct appeal or through the issuance of a fed-
eral writ of habeas corpus. 10 9 Heck thereby eliminates one of the prin-
cipal concerns underlying the Briscoe decision: that since "'[t] he loser
in one forum will frequently seek relief in another ... [a] bsolute im-
munity is ... necessary to assure that ... witnesses can perform...
without harassment or intimidation."' 110
The Heck decision avoids the possibility of conflicting decisions
being issued by those courts reviewing an individual's conviction and
others reviewing his § 1983 claim for damages stemming from that
conviction.I' As a result, however, Heck undermines Briscoe's concern
"'that those involved in judicial proceedings should be given every
encouragement to make a full disclosure of all pertinent information
within their knowledge.' "' 112 Instead, Briscoe and Heck, taken to-
gether, discourage full disclosure; they permit officers to lie with im-
punity at trial, knowing that a § 1983 claimant may not challenge
perjured testimony without first invalidating his underlying conviction
and, even then, absolute immunity protects them from civil liability.
105 Id. at 335 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring)).
106 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
107 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
108 Id. at 484 (quoting 8 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5
(1991)).
109 Id. at 486-87.
110 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978)).
111 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.
112 Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 439 (1976)
(White, J., concurring)); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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This result goes beyond any legitimate purpose of witness immunity
and makes a mockery of the criminal justice system.
The Supreme Court originally relied on both common law doc-
trine and historical analysis to read absolute immunity into § 1983.113
Such immunity is premised on the need to ensure that government
officials can function effectively without fear of litigation for exercis-
ing important discretionary functions. Accordingly, "[t] he policy un-
derlying absolute immunity is a concern with the chilling effect of
potential section 1983 damages litigation upon the exercise of deci-
sion-making authority."114 Because absolute immunity confers com-
plete immunity from suit and not just protection against liability,
115
officials seeking this unique status must demonstrate that "such an
exemption is justified by overriding considerations of public policy."
116
Prior to Briscoe, the Court declined to extend absolute immunity
beyond a very limited class of officials, including the President of the
United States, legislators carrying out their legislative functions, and
judges carrying out their judicial functions, "whose special functions or
constitutional status requires complete protection from suit.
11 7 Police wit-
nesses, by comparison, fall far short of this threshold. Unlike other
beneficiaries of absolute immunity, their function at trial does not- or
at least should not-involve any discretionary function. Police officers
do not have discretion to commit perjury, nor does their trial testi-
mony involve any other constitutional decisionmaking function.
Moreover, to the degree that officers merit protection from po-
tentially abusive litigation, less drastic means than complete immunity
from suit under the CRA are available. Recognizing that relatively few
categories of potential defendants warrant such broad immunity, the
Supreme Court has conferred qualified immunity upon others deserv-
ing of some lesser measure of protection. 118 Although not complete
protection from suit, qualified immunity provides an affirmative de-
fense for conduct that "does not violate clearly established statutory or
113 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-78 (1950); see also Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (stating that § 1983 immunity is "predicated
upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant offi-
cial at common law and the interests behind it").
114 2 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 7:1.
115 Id.
116 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988) (emphasis added).
117 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (emphasis added).
118 "The availability of qualified immunity reflects a balance between the interest
in preventing, and compensating for, constitutional violations and the interest in
avoiding the overdeterrence of independent decision making by government offi-
cials." 2 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 8:1.
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."' 19
According to the Supreme Court, qualified immunity provides
"ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law" 120 and adequately shields police officers
sued in connection with their "investigative" functions. 121 By confer-
ring absolute immunity upon officers performing their "'judicial'
function" as trial witnesses, Briscoe produced the anomaly of allowing
an officer to face § 1983 liability for knowingly filing a false police
report-which neither absolute nor qualified immunity protects-yet
precluding liability for committing the more serious offense of perjury
at a criminal trial. 122 In other words, because qualified immunity
would suffice, Briscoe simply goes too far, and it creates perverse
incentives.
As Briscoe has become firmly embedded judicial doctrine, 123 only
legislative reform can restore proper symmetry and accountability
under the CRA. Thus far, however, no Briscoe critic has offered a legis-
lative solution directly responsive to the Supreme Court's analysis of
the CRA. One commentator, for example, approached the problem
indirectly by proposing elimination of the exclusionary rule to remove
the incentive for police perjury. 124 That proposal, however, is neither
practical nor desirable. Although admittedly controversial, the exclu-
sionary rule is constitutionally based. 125 Short of a constitutional
119 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).
120 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
121 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 500
U.S. 259, 273-74 (1993) (distinguishing between a prosecutor's investigative and judi-
cial functions). Note that the evidentiary elements of a perjury-based § 1983 action
actually protect an officer more than the qualified immunity defense because perjury
requires proof that the officer lied intentionally. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 359
F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that perjury requires a knowingly false declara-
tion); United States v. Leonos-Marquez, 323 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
perjury requires intent to provide false testimony). In contrast, incompetent or know-
ing conduct renders the officer liable. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
122 See Scott v. Hem, 216 F.3d 897, 911-12 (10th Cir. 2000) (implying that even if
an officer included knowingly false information in a police report which would sup-
port an action under § 1983, the officer was entitled to absolute immunity for any
claims arising out of perjury at trial); cf. Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41 (holding that
qualified immunity provides sufficient protection to police officers applying for
warrants).
123 See lA ScHWARTz & KutKLIN, supra note 64, § 9.10 (setting forth a wide range of
illustrative decisions applying Briscoe absolute immunity to witnesses).
124 Slobogin, supra note 10, at 1057-59.
125 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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amendment, Congress may not repeal it.126 Further, although the
problem of police perjury is certainly an important issue in the debate
over the exclusionary rule, there are many others of great complex-
ity.127 Allowing concern with police perjury to drive this debate would
improperly reward officers who choose to oppose the exclusionary
rule by corrupting the judicial process.
128
Rather than tamper with the exclusionary rule, Congress should
begin to address the problem of police perjury by amending § 1983 to
eliminate absolute immunity for law enforcement witnesses. 129 Under
this proposal, such witnesses would still retain qualified immunity.
Further, private witnesses would retain Briscoe's protections. The com-
mon law grounds for absolute immunity still apply with equal force to
private witnesses, as their cooperation is often vital to effective law en-
forcement. Moreover, no evidence exists that private witness perjury
is a pervasive problem in the criminal justice system. The following
text would implement this reform:
The Civil Rights Perjury Prevention Act
The text of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 is amended as follows:
Immunities:
Qualified Immunity: Liability under section 1983 shall not extend to any
law enforcement officer whose conduct does not violate clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. 
130
126 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.").
127 See, e.g., 1 LAFAvE, supra note 71, § 1.2 (containing extensive discussion of mul-
tiple issues concerning the exclusionary rule).
128 This would be especially ironic, as the Supreme Court originally developed the
rule due to concern that admitting illegally obtained evidence undermines judicial
integrity. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914). See generally Gerard V.
Bradley, Present at the Creation? A Critical Guide to Weeks v. United States and Its Prog-
eny, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1031 (1986) (tracing the history of both the exclusionary
rule's development and the criticism of the rule).
129 Indeed, Congress could use this occasion wisely to review all judicially created
immunities under the CRA and to repeal those no longer appropriate to modern civil
rights enforcement. As former SenatorJohn McClellan observed in another context:
"Congress in fulfilling its proper legislative role must examine not only individual
instances, but whole problems .... [I]t has a duty not to engage in piecemeal legisla-
tion. Whatever the limited occasion for the identification of a problem, Congress has
the duty of enacting a principled solution to the entire problem." 116 CONG. REC.
18,914 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
130 This text codifies the Supreme Court's standard for qualified immunity. See
supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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Absolute Immunity: Except as stated below, United States Supreme Court
decisions defining absolute immunity remain in full force and effect. 131
Exception: No employee or agent132 of any law enforcement agency is enti-
tled to absolute immunity for testifying or providing any statements, under oath




In 1992, despite international protest, a Time magazine cover
story,1 34 and a papal plea for leniency, the State of Virginia executed
Roger Coleman for a rape and murder that he probably did not com-
131 Legislation sometimes cross references prevailing Supreme Court decisions.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (2000). In this instance, the cross reference serves to
retain absolute immunity for legislators performing legislative functions and for
judges and prosecutors performing judicial functions. See supra notes 18, 81 and ac-
companying text. Of course, after conducting a more comprehensive review of pre-
vailing CRA immunities, Congress may choose to eliminate some of them by adding
to the enumerated exceptions.
132 The proposal extends to agents because a heightened risk of perjury exists
whenever a witness has a close relationship with a law enforcement agency. Typical
examples might include paid informants and defendants working to win "substantial
assistance" departures from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See Keri A. Gould, Turn-
ing Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835, 866-69
(1993) (discussing the risks and moral implications of permitting substantial assis-
tance sentencing reductions in exchange for cooperation); A. Jack Finklea, Note, Le-
niency in Exchange for Testimony: Bribery or Effective Prosecution?, 33 IND. L. REV. 957,
977-79 (2000) (criticizing substantial assistance departures for promoting inaccurate
testimony). See generally Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases,
45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 23-33 (1992) (discussing risks of perjured testimony stemming
from cooperation agreements). Federal courts have expressed similar concerns. See
United States v. Jones, 145 F.3d 959, 970 (8th Cir. 1998) (Bright, J., dissenting)
("[T]here are serious inherent incentives to perjury; and prosecutors indulge a wide
variety of unstructured practices with respect to substantial assistance motions.");
United States v. Mansker, 240 F. Supp. 2d 902, 921 (N.D. Iowa 2003) ("[S]ubstantial
reductions in sentences for cooperating against others, have, in my view, brought
enormous pressure on cooperators to stretch the truth and to provide previously un-
known and all too often false information to federal prosecutors in exchange for...
substantial assistance motions.").
133 The proposed text makes clear that absolute immunity does not apply to any
statements or testimony under oath. This broad language eliminates an existing cir-
cuit conflict concerning pretrial testimony. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
134 Jill Smolowe, Must This Man Die?, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 40 (cover story). Prior
to the Coleman article, Time magazine had not devoted a cover story to a condemned
prisoner since 1960. JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE STORY OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT 274 (1997).
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mit. 135 At best, a crucial police witness testified inaccurately at Cole-
man's trial. At worst, the officer committed perjury. 136 Under the
CRA, the distinction between inaccurate testimony and perjury makes
no difference, however, as Briscoe v. LaHue conferred all trial wit-
nesses, including police officers, with absolute immunity.
137
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Briscoe reflected questionable
analyses of both statutory text and legislative history. After more than
twenty years, however, these points are no longer worth debating. As
a matter of sound social policy, Congress should intervene to repeal
absolute immunity for law enforcement witnesses. Police officers
would still enjoy ample protection under the doctrine of qualified im-
munity. Of course, legislative reform requires political action. But
even in today's highly charged political atmosphere, this issue need
not be divisive. Regardless of ideology, all should agree that convict-
ing the innocent offends basic principles of justice-especially since it
also permits the true violator to go unpunished.
13 8
Much remains to be done to reduce the risk of false convictions.
Amending the CRA to provide a civil remedy for victims of police per-
jury would be a long overdue first step.
135 See TUCKER, supra note 134, at 315-30. Today, Coleman's supporters are work-
ing to exonerate him through DNA analysis. Lois Romano, When DNA Meets Death
Row, It's the System That's Tested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at Al.
136 See TUCKER, supra note 134, at 66 (noting the inconsistency and an officer ac-
knowledging inaccurate testimony).
137 Absent such immunity, Coleman's estate could have filed a civil rights action
on his behalf. See 1 NAHMOD, supra note 85, § 1.12.
138 See Scott Christianson, After 14 Years, Another Crack at Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2005, § 14LI, at 13, available at 2005 WLNR 1273417.
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